Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:  Law and the Inner Self by Carrier, Michael A.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 93 Issue 6 
1995 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self 
Michael A. Carrier 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Judges Commons, Legal Biography Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael A. Carrier, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1894 (1995). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol93/iss6/39 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF. 
By G. Edward White. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. ix, 
628. $37.50. 
G. Edward White1 has embraced a task of monumental propor-
tions. A biography concentrating on either the life or the work of 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. must be complex and thorough; one 
exploring the interaction between the two proinises to be hercu-
lean. Yet White emerges victorious in the end, letting his extensive 
research, lucid prose, and keen insights guide the reader effortlessly 
through the 490-page biography. 
White begins his journey with an autobiographical statement 
Holmes wrote as a senior at Harvard College (p. 7). The statement 
frames the opening chapter, "Heritage," as it introduces the sub-
jects upon which White will initially focus: Holmes's father, 
mother, ancestors, experience at Harvard College, and early liter-
ary endeavors (pp. 7-8). The author first discusses Holmes's com-
plex relationship with his father, Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr. -
author of the Autocrat essays,2 poet, and Harvard Medical School 
professor (pp. 9-11). Dr. Holmes was "one of the last true general-
ists ... a prime mover in an astonishing range of fields: in medicine, 
psychology, and theology, as well as in lecturing and literature."3 
White carefully delineates various aspects of the father-son rela-
tionship, noting both parties' competitiveness, egotism, and con-
cealed affection for each other (pp. 11-14). The author asserts that 
Holmes adopted his father's idea of a "life plan," but that his self-
preoccupation, in contrast to his father's vivaciousness, channelled 
his achievements into one field - the law.4 Next comes Amelia 
1. University Professor and John B. Minor Professor of Law and History, University of 
Virginia. 
2. These immensely popular essays, which appeared in the Atlantic Monthly, described an 
"autocrat" narrator holding forth in a "mythical rooming house" on a wide variety of sub-
jects, including religion, the art of conversation, literary societies, and vulgarisms in speech. 
P. 9. 
3. Peter Gibian, Opening and Closing the Conversation: Style and Stance from Holmes 
Senior to Holmes Junior, in THE LEGACY OF OUVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 187 (Robert W. 
Gordon ed., 1992). 
4. White may overemphasize the role of personality in Holmes's "narrowing and refining 
his field of study." P. 13. The younger Holmes sketched a life plan based upon not only his 
"self-preoccupation and singlemindedness" (p. 14), but also his desire to distance himself 
from his father, whose achievements - at least according to his son - paled in comparison 
with his popularity: 
Not having been blessed (or cursed) with his father's exuberant versatility the tempta-
tion to scatter his talents was probably less compelling, but the son's literary, philosophi-
cal, and artistic interests were certainly of sufficient in~ensity to have made diffusion of 
his energy a real possibility had not the example of his father given warning of the dam-
age which may result from that diffusion. 
1894 
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Holmes, the devoted mother trapped in the constraints of the pre-
Victorian era (pp. 14-17). White notes that she "passionately 
grasped" opportunities for achievement within the domestic sphere 
and directed her energies "almost exclusively toward the comfort of 
her husband and children."5 The ancestors follow, in particular, the 
grandfathers - Judge Charles Jackson, member of the mercantile 
community and justice on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts, and the Reverend Abiel Holmes, minister and historian (pp. 
17-19) - each illustrating distinct aspects of Holmes's secular and 
religious heritage. 
After tracing Holmes's ancestral lineage, White turns to early 
environmental influences on Holmes: the provincial yet intellectual 
Brahmin Boston (pp. 20-24) and Harvard College (pp. 25-32). 
Harvard's classes and professors did not have a significant influence 
on Holmes.6 Indeed, the college's criteria for ranking students be-
lied its rigid atmosphere: "Points were assigned for student 
achievements and reduced for disciplinary violations, so that intel-
lectual performances and what the faculty saw as moral perform-
ances were regarded as equivalents" (p. 25). Instead, Harvard 
introduced Holmes to what would become lifelong activities: avid 
reading, writing, and the cultivation of friendships and intimacies 
(pp. 26-27). After a discussion of the motivation Holmes received 
from the art critic John Ruskin and the transcendentalist sage 
Ralph Waldo Emerson - both of whom provided Holmes with a 
historicist perspective7 - White closes the chapter by highlighting 
the tension between "the cumulative weight" of Holmes's ancestral 
heritage and Holmes's current self, as revealed through his literary 
achievements, membership in social clubs, and participation in the 
Civil War (p. 47). The author remarks that Holmes even attempted 
to distance himself from his ancestors' "natural bent" to literature 
(pp. 47-48), even though the literary style would later be omnipres-
ent in his judicial opinions and legal writings. 
MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE OUVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING YEARS 1841-
1870 at 20-21 (1957) [hereinafter HoWE, SHAPING YEARS]. 
5. Pp. 15-16. Amelia Holmes succeeded in this endeavor: "It was her artistry that bal-
anced the demands and desires of each family member, that soothed the tensions between 
the generations and the rivalries among the young, that provided the cement that held the 
[Holmes family] together." LlvA BA~ THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON Hu.!.: THE LIFE AND 
TIMES OF OUVER WENDELL HOLMES 65 (1991). Balcer also describes Holmes's siblings: 
Amelia Jackson Holmes, a "chatterbox," and Edward Jackson ("Ned"} Holmes, a "practical 
joker." Id. Oliver Wendell Holmes "seems only rarely to have noticed [his siblings] in his 
preoccupation with trying to escape Dr. Holmes's shadow •••. " Id.; see also p. 495 n.61 
(noting that Holmes "does not seem to have been particularly close to either sibling"). 
6. See HoWE, SHAPING YEARS, supra note 4, at 78. 
7. Pp. 34-39. Such perspective "defined the course of societal change as continuous and 
inevitable, so that the 'past' was necessarily different from the 'present.' " P. 34. 
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Chapter 1\vo - "The Civil War" - emphasizes an experience 
that had a profound impact on Holmes's view of the world. The 
war affected Holmes not only in the brute force of its imagery and 
its revelation of the insignificance of the individual in the face of 
collective and historical forces,8 but also in providing a contrast 
with the conversational - and often inconclusive - milieu of his 
father.9 
White imposes on the Civil War chapter a tripartite structure 
that extracts and situates Holmes's post hoc memorialization of the 
war in his professional life. The initial section of ~e chapter offers 
a chronology of Holmes's wartime experience, tracing his involve-
ment - including the battles he saw and his injuries - between his 
enlistment in August 1861 and his departure from the war in July 
1864 (pp. 50-65). The second part highlights Holmes's contempora-
neous reactions to his experience. White sketches Holmes's in-
creasing disenchantment with war and his evolving conception of 
loyalty: first to a cause, then to the regiment, and finally to him-
self. to It is this evolution, with its accompanying feelings of guilt,11 
for which Holmes sought to make amends in his recollections of the 
war in subsequent years. Such recollections constitute the subject 
of the third part of the chapter, in which White depicts an "official" 
bloodless and duty-laden conception of the war replacing Holmes's 
specific memories of the atrocities.12 Unable to relinquish the war-
like spirit, Holmes sought to draw analogies between his judicial 
work and the war. In addressing a fiftieth reunion of the Harvard 
8. The impact of the war on Holmes's life philosophy is revealed by statements such as: 
"[O]ur only but wholly adequate significance is as parts of the unimaginable whole." Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Jr., "Parts of the Unimaginable Whole" Address (June 28, 1911), reprinted 
in MAx LERNER, THE MIND AND FAlTII OF JusnCE HOLMES 27 (1943); "[Heroism involves] 
the ability to become a cog in a large, disciplined machine, to accept one's place as a single 
soldier in the unknowable movements of a huge army." Gibian, supra note 3, at 206; "No 
society has ever admitted that it could not sacrifice individual welfare to its own existence." 
OUVER WENDELL HoLMES, JR., THE CoMMoN LAw 43 (1881). For Holmes, the insignifi-
cance of the individual in the face of the larger entity would ultimately evolve into an insig-
nificance in the expanse of the universe and passage of time. 
9. See Gibian, supra note 3, at 196 ("In the endless give-and-take of Holmes Senior's 
conversations, no assertion is ever final . • • . [T]his chaos ..• might ••• stand as a troubling 
picture not only of a mind divided or a boardinghouse divided but of a nation divided."). 
10. Pp. 65-72. Holmes demonstrated the latter loyalty in his decision not to reenlist after 
the expiration of his three-year term. He "had had enough of war •••• [He] desire[d] to 
preserve himself rather than ... appear chivalric and honorable." Pp. 71-72. 
11. Holmes's feelings of guilt stemmed from leaving the battlefield before dying or be-
coming a general: "All his life he worried that he had not met his obligation; if he had to do 
it again, he told friends, he would have stayed through the war." Hiller B. Zobel, The Three 
Civil Wars of Oliver Wendell Holmes: Notes for an Odyssey (Part Ill), BOSTON B.J., Feb. 
1983, at 24. 
12. Pp. 72-86. Such a conception mirrors Holmes's increased detachment from the world 
around him; the Civil War planted in Holmes "[t]he deadening of sympathetic feelings, the 
Olympian aloofness, the spectator view ••. the belief in heroic action, the disbelief in causes 
.•.. " Saul Touster, In Search of Holmes from Within, 18 V AND. L. REv. 457, 470 (1965). 
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Class of 1861, for example, Holmes referred to the work of soldiers 
as "hammer[ing] out as compact and solid a piece of work as one 
can."13 Although White acknowledges that, on one level, the anal-
ogy between war and judging could be viewed as "nonsensical," he 
recognizes that Holm.es sought to replicate in his judicial pursuits 
the passions he experienced in war, and to "reassure himself that he 
was still participating in the fight ... that he could continue to claim 
the privilege of having been touched with fire" (p. 86). 
White appropriately locates an origin of Holmes's judicial pas-
sion in his Civil War background. Yet he fails to explore three 
other origins of Holmes's motivation. First, Holmes's mother en-
dowed her son with a strong ambition. As Holmes wrote, "[B]y the 
temperament I get from my mother, without some feeling of ac-
complishment I feel as if it were time for me to die."14 Second, 
Holmes's Puritan background - the spirit that dictates that "to 
take the easy way is to take the wrong way"15 - impelled him 
onward. Finally, intellectual exploration motivated Holmes; his 
ambition manifested itself not in a quest for particular positions, 
but in a constant test of his mental capacity.16 
White continues his exploration of Holmes's nonlegal life in the 
third chapter, tracing Holmes's "Friendships, Companions, and At-
tachments" between 1864 and 1882. After briefly discussing 
Holmes's attendance at Harvard Law School - "a desultory, tedi-
ous experience" (p. 91 ), yet one that convinced him that the law 
was to be his profession-White turns to Holmes's social acquaint-
ances. Beginning in 1866, and continuing through 1913, Holmes 
embarked on nine sojourns to Great Britain to partake of the high 
13. Holmes, "Parts of the Unimaginable Whole" Address (June 28, 1911), reprinted in 
LERNER, supra note 8, at 25, 27. 
14. HoWE, SHAPING YEARS, supra note 4, at 280 n.h (quoting II Holmes-Laski Letters 
1278 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1941)). 
15. MARK DEWOLFE HoWE, JusnCE OUVER WENDELL Hot.MES: THE PROVING YEARS 
1870-1882 at 282 (1963) [hereinafter HOWE, PROVING YEARS]; see also Q&A: A Conversa-
tion with Paul Freund in HARVARD GAZETIE, July 5, 1991, at 5 (Holmes's "Puritan work 
ethic" is revealed through his statement that "the work never is done, although the race is 
over."); HoWE, SHAPING YEARS, supra note 4, at 280 (Holmes "was always possessed by an 
impelling sense of time's urgency, - a Puritan's feeling of responsibility that no moment 
should be wasted."). White recognizes the Puritan influence on Holmes in, for example, 
Holmes's voracious reading and his self-control (p. 23), but he does not extrapolate such 
beliefs to the realms of ambition and motivation. 
16. See, e.g., HoWE, SHAPING YEARS, supra note 4, at 280-81 ("I assume that your ambi-
tion, like mine, cannot be satisfied by office or anything resting in the will of others but only 
by the trembling hope that you have hit the ut de poitrine." (quoting letter from Holmes to 
Judge Learned Hand (Mar. 18, 1922) (Holmes Papers (on file at Harvard Law School)))); 
THE ESSENTIAL Hot.MES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETrERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINlONS, 
AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OUVER WENDELL HoLMES, JR., at 29 (Richard A. Posner ed., 
1992) ("The thing I have wanted to do and want to do is to put as many new ideas into the 
law as I can, to show how particular solutions involve general theory, and to do it with style." 
(quoting letter from Holmes to Patrick Sheehan (Dec. 15, 1912) (Holmes Papers (on file at 
Harvard Law School)))). · 
1898 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 93:1894 
society, culture, and conversations that life there availed (pp. 95-
102). He would cultivate intimate relationships on these trips, par-
ticularly one - described in Chapter Seven - with Clare 
Castletown, a member of the "Ascendancy," or Anglo-Irish land-
owning class (pp. 230-49). Although Holmes visited Castletown 
several times in his travels, it is the correspondence between them 
that has generated the most attention. The pair traded letters from 
1896 until 1927, often sharing their innermost thoughts. Holmes 
wrote to Castletown in September 1896 that a recent letter she sent 
"is what I have been longing for and is water to my thirst,"17 and 
two years later, after returning from abroad, rejoiced: "Oh my dear 
what joy it is to feel the inner chambers of one's soul open for the 
other to walk in and out at will."18 Holmes wrote perhaps his most 
passionate letter two weeks later, in language revealing that he had 
lost control of his emotions: "I long long long for you and think 
think think about you. You would be satisfied I think."19 
In stark contrast to such passion stands Holmes's wife of fifty-
two years, Fanny Dixwell Holmes. Fanny was not privy to her hus-
band's professional work, nor did she accompany him on his trips 
abroad.20 In fact, she was more of a social recluse than he, in part, 
perhaps, because of an attack of rheumatic fever one month after 
marrying Holmes (p. 105). Although she possessed a strong wit, 
effectively played the role of hostess upon the Holmeses' arrival in 
Washington, D.C., and provided emotional support for her hus-
band, she was "relegated to a distinctly bounded realm of Holmes' 
existence" (p. 107). For in the end, Holmes would not let anyone 
interfere with his work. 
In Chapter Four, White turns to Holmes's early legal scholar-
ship, examining such work for its own sake and not merely as a 
precursor to his more famous subsequent work. The author notes 
that scholarship was "the professional center of [Holmes's] life dur-
ing his late twenties and thirties" (p. 112). Although such scholar-
ship often derived from the works of others, Holmes refused to 
acknowledge, and even downplayed, his predecessors' contribu-
tions.21 White traces Holmes's methodological shift from the philo-
17. P. 232 (quoting letter from Holmes to Clare Castletown (Sept. 5, 18%) (Holmes Pa-
pers (on file at Harvard Law School))). 
18. P. 240 (quoting letter from Holmes to Clare Castletown (Sept. 5, 1898) (Holmes Pa-
pers (on file at Harvard Law School))). 
19. P. 242 (quoting letter from Holmes to Clare Castletown (Sept. 16, 1898) (Holmes 
Papers (on file at Harvard Law School))). 
20. After accompanying her husband on two trips to England - as it turned out, her only 
such trips - "it was clear ••• that she did not take the same relish in the company of English 
socialites that he did." P. 102. 
21. For example, Holmes adopted a theory of Henry Maine's in The Common Law, but 
asserted that: "I do not think [Maine] will leave much mark on the actual structure of juris-
prudence." P. 115 (quoting letter from Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Mar. 4, 1888) {I 
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sophical classification of legal subjects (pp. 117-18, 122-23) to 
systems of historical analysis (pp. 129, 133-34) to considerations of 
public policy (pp. 139-40). Despite such shifts, the new interpretive 
techniques did not completely displace their predecessors, but in-
stead combined to provide Holmes with a distinctive methodology 
(p. 147). 
White's examination of Holmes's early scholarship takes on new 
meaning by the time the familiar opening paragraph of The Com-
mon Law arrives in Chapter Five: 
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The 
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, 
intuitions of public policy ... even the prejudices which judges share 
with their fellow men, have had a good deal more to po than the syllo-
gism in determining the rules by which men should be govemed.22 
White notes that such memorable rhetoric, rather than Holmes's 
detailed exposition of areas of the law, led to the work's critical 
acclaim (p. 180). He reveals weaknesses in The Common Law, such 
as Holmes's purposive reading of cases,23 inconsistencies with asser-
tions in prior works,24 and varying uses of history. The latter incon-
sistency is perhaps most evident: Holmes used history to explain 
anomalies in legal doctrine25 and to serve as an instrument of pol-
icy,26 and at other times he did not draw on history at all.27 Yet 
White also emphasizes the originality and monument of Holmes's 
task and his success in showing that "legal doctrine is the product of 
a complex interaction" between "internal professional and extra-
legal factors. "28 
Ho/mes-Pollock Letters 31 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1941))); see also THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES; 
supra note 16, at xx ("lack of generosity toward [his predecessors] ... was one of Holmes's 
sins") (emphasis omitted)). 
22. P. 149 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES, JR., THE CoMMoN LAw 1 (1881)). 
23. For instance, Holmes "insist[s]" that an objective theory of contracts predominates in 
"the most arguably subjective sphere of the common law - private bilateral contracts cre-
ated as a result of the subjective preferences of 'free' individuals in a market setting ••.. " P. 
178. 
24. In reversing a previously-stated position that civil liability was not based on a "culpa-
ble state of mind" (p. 121), Holmes "was not loath to use historical research he had earlier 
employed for [this] purpose ... to show, antithetically," that one's subjective intentions could 
result in liability. P. 157. 
25. Some legal rules could "only be understood by reference to the infancy of procedure 
among the German tribes, or to the social condition of Rome under the Decemvirs." P. 170 
(quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE CoMMON LAW 2). 
26. Holmes's lectures on criminal law, torts, and contracts "used history •.. less as a 
source of doctrinal anomalies .•• than as support for •.• policy arguments themselves." P. 
179. . 
27. "[A]ll [Holmes's] argument in the lecture on criminal law was conducted without any 
direct references to history." P. 158. 
28. P. 195; see also BAKER, supra note 5, at 257 ("[Holmes's] principal discovery [in The 
Common Law], the one that set his book apart from the others and the one that later was to 
set Holmes apart from judges of his time .•• was the concept that law .•. was not at all static, 
but was evolutionary and responded to the social and· economic environment of which it was 
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White extracts various themes that predominate throughout The 
Common Law: the emphasis on "experience" rather than "logic" 
in the development of legal doctrine; the foundation of doctrine in 
substantive - as opposed to formal - values; and the preference 
for objective29 and external standards (pp. 180-81 ). The author 
fully discusses these themes in his thorough and meticulous 48-page 
tour of The Common Law. He summarizes and critiques the work 
in detail (pp. 148-79), explores the contemporaneous reaction to 
the work (pp. 182-91), and seeks to locate it in a historical perspec-
tive (pp. 191-93). 
White does not, however, fully explore the origin of the themes 
that permeate The Common Law. Why experience over logic? The 
impact of the Civil War springs to mind: Holmes may have seen 
"his own convictions crumble when they felt the impact of real-
ity. "30 Or perhaps his membership in the Metaphysical Club - a 
small, elitist philosophical society whose members included Charles 
Sanders Peirce, the founder of pragmatism31 - laid the founda-
tion for the elevation of experience.32 Why objective, rather than 
subjective, standards? Perhaps because in Holmes's world view -
forged on the battlefield - individuals were insignificant in the 
face of the larger enterprise.33 Or perhaps the war experience en-
couraged Holmes to mete out punishment based on the degree of 
danger34 created by an act rather than the actor's subjective 
intention. 
Another theme running through The Common Law is Holmes's 
quest to organize the law. His unification of standards of civil and 
criminal liability, for example, was unprecedented. Though White 
finds it "striking" (p. 155), he does not uncover Holmes's rationale 
a part .•.. "); THE EssENTIAL HoLMES, supra note 16, at xxii ("The functional, evolutionary, 
policy-saturated perspective of The Common Law was a considerable innovation in legal 
scholarship."). 
29. One commentator proclaimed that "[i]f there is a single, overriding, and repetitive 
theme running through Holmes's writing, it is the necessity and desirability of establishing 
objective rules of law .... " Morton J. Horwitz, The Place of Justice Holmes in American 
Legal Thought, in THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., supra note 3, at 32. 
30. HoWE, SHAPING YEARS, supra note 4, at 285. 
31. Pragmatism "is that distinctively American philosophical school that requires ideas, 
like engines, to be useful, workable, and practical if they are to be believed, if they are to 
have merit It relies oh experiment for truth and on action for justification." BAKER, supra 
note 5, at 216. 
32. Baker asserts that the ''nurtur[ing]" by the others in the group of "so many notions 
similar to [Holmes's] own could not but have bolstered [his] confidence in the speculations 
he had been advancing ...• " Id. 
33. See supra note 8. 
34. White illustrates the degree-of-danger factor in describing the criminal law of at-
tempts, which punishes attempted crimes based on the level of danger posed by the defend-
ant's act. P. 160. See, e.g., Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) ("[T]he law is full 
of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subse-
quently estimates it, some matter of degree."). 
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for such an endeavor.3s In the stylistic realm, White situates the 
obscurity of the language in The Common Law in its author's at-
tempt to distinguish himself from his father, who utilized the genre 
of "popular" language (p. 183). White hypothesizes that "the most 
distinctive feature of Holmes as a stylist, his epigrammatic terse-
ness, was consciously or unconsciously adopted as a badge of iden-
tity. "36 Yet the author does not carry over such personal-
professional interrelations to the book's substantive realm, leading 
the reader to wonder about the effect of Holmes's inner self on the 
broad themes of The Common Law. 
In Chapter Six - Holmes's "All Round View of the Law" -
White integrates the subject's Civil War experience into his 
speeches and work. In a lecture to Harvard undergraduates in 
1886, Holmes exhorted the audience to exercise the "barbaric thirst 
for conquest" and to "think great thoughts [by being] heroes as well 
as idealists."37 A few months later, he accepted an honorary degree 
from Yale University "as an accolade, like the little blow upon the 
shoulder from the sword of a master of war .... "38 White is not 
mesmerized by such references. He persuasively notes the distinc-
tions between war and scholarship, and suggests that Holmes's at-
tempt to see himself as an "honorable soldier" may have been a 
justification for distinguishing himself, by pursuing scholarship, 
from the commercialization and "power-seeking" of his age (p. 
215). 
White next discusses Holmes's scholarship after The Common 
Law, in particular, the 1882 article, "The Path of the Law." This 
work mirrored The Common Law in its classification system and 
suspicion of logic, but broke new and memorable ground in its in-
creased emphasis on a positivist approach to law, highlighted by the 
35. One impetus driving Holmes may have been his scientific methodology. See p. 42. 
Another may have been the zeitgeist "Order, uniformity, certainty, and predictability were 
the main goals of legal as well as nonlegal writers ofth[e] era." Horwitz, supra note 29, at 39. 
36. P. 183. In analyzing the literary foundations for such memorable rhetoric, one com-
mentator has observed that Holmes's language sounds "strong and impressive precisely be-
cause [it is] totally unqualified and unconditional"; he only marshals the data that support his 
conclusiOn. Mathias W. Reimann, Holmes's Common Law and German Legal Science, in 
THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., supra note 3, at 105. Another has noted 
that Holmes's sentences, often "built around the verb 'to be' •.• are definitions, autocratic 
edicts or clearly marked statements of firm personal belief intended to distinguish by fiat 
what is from what is not." Gibian, supra note 3, at 200-01. 
37. P. 211 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Profession of the Law" (Feb. 17, 
1886), in THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 28-30 (Mark 
Dewolfe Howe ed., 1962)) [hereinafter OCCASIONAL SPEECHES]. 
38. P. 214 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "On Receiving the Degree of Doctor of 
Laws" (June 30, 1886), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 37, at 32). 
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"bad man" metaphor39 and the assertion that the law merely equal-
led "prophecies of what the courts will do in fact."40 
Notwithstanding the strength of his scholarship, Holmes 
achieved his greatest renown from his opinions as a judge and Jus-
tice. After one year as a professor at Harvard Law School, he was 
appointed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (p. 202). 
Although Holmes, upon leaving the court two decades later, would 
describe his years on the Supreme Judicial Court as "the twenty 
happiest years of my life,''41 he nevertheless encountered frustra-
tion when confronted with a caseload composed of "trifling or tran-
sitory matters" (p. 255). At times, Holmes sought to apply a 
broader view of the law, using the methodologies he had previously 
developed. Thus, he limited tort liability (pp. 264-65), applied ex-
ternal theories of criminal conduct (pp. 259-63), utilized an empiri-
cal approach in bailment cases (p. 273), and applied an objective 
theory of contracts.42 In the few constitutional cases he addressed, 
Holmes foreshadowed future Supreme Court opinions by deferring 
to the legislature (pp. 280-86). His best-known state court opinions 
applied his theory of atomistic competition to the field of labor dis-
putes (pp. 287-89). In his dissent in Vegelahn v. Guntner,43 Holmes 
upheld the right of workers to picket, viewing such activity as a 
form of competition.44 Plant v. Woods4s followed, and Holmes dis-
sented again, this time upholding union solidarity - in the form of 
strikes and boycotts - that interfered with economic relationships 
(pp. 289-91). Despite his involvement in such noteworthy cases, 
Holmes felt his chances for national recognition slipping away with 
the passage of time. 
39. Holmes's hypothetical "bad man" acted in accordance with "what the courts could be 
expected to let him get away with." P. 219. 
40. P. 219 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law," Address Deliv-
ered at Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in OUVER WENDELL HOLMES, Cot.. 
LECTED LEGAL PAPERS 173 (1920)). Richard Posner noted that the "The Path of the Law" 
may be "the best article-length work on law ever written." THE EssENTIAL HoLMES, supra 
note 16, at x. 
41. P. 255 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "'I\venty Years in Retrospect," Speech 
(Dec. 3, 1902), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 37, at 154). 
42. Pp. 273-80. Holmes's across-the-board application of this theory often resulted, as 
White points out, in outcomes that "were not what at least one of the 'contracting' parties 
wanted." P. 280. 
43. 167 Mass. 92, 104 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (dissenting from Court's decision to 
enjoin employees' picketing of employer). 
44. Holmes reasoned, according to one commentator, that the picketing workers were 
competing with organized capital "for a larger share of the society's wealth. Workers and 
employers ... were competitors, and the law ought to be neutral in their struggle." Mark 
Tushnet, The Logic of Experience: Oliver Wendell Holmes on the Supreme Judicial Court, 63 
VA. L. REv. 975, 1038 (1977). 
45. 176 Mass. 492, 504 (1900) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the court's deci-
sion to enjoin a union from strong-arming recalcitrant workers in an effort to compel them to 
join the union). 
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An opportunity to achieve national prominence presented itself 
in 1902 with President Theodore Roosevelt's nomination - and 
the Senate's confirmation- of Holmes to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
A number of fortuitous forces coalesced in Holmes's favor: the 
opening up of the "Massachusetts seat" on the Court upon the re-
tirement of Justice Horace Gray; the assassination of former Presi-
dent William McKinley, thus precluding his intended nomination of 
Alfred Hemenway, a former law partner of Secretary of the Navy 
John Davis Long; and Holmes's personal relationship with both the 
new President, Theodore Roosevelt, and the junior Senator from 
Massachusetts, Henry Cabot Lodge (pp. 299-303). Holmes imme-
diately recognized this window of opportunity; during a trip to 
Roosevelt's private residence prior to the nomination, Holmes "was 
waiting on Roosevelt, entertaining [Roosevelt's] children, focusing 
all his energies on not letting the nomination slip away" (p. 304). 
Once on the Court, Holmes immersed himself in his work, writ-
ing opinions at a breakneck pace46 and forgoing the social flirta-
tions and intimacies of his past (pp. 308-11 ). He rarely interacted 
with his fellow Justices, viewing them primarily as hindrances who 
inhibited his writing.47 In fact, the only two Justices who Holmes 
befriended during the course of his tenure on the Court were Chief 
Justice Melville Fuller, who had the power to assign opinions, and 
Justice Louis Brandeis, whose intellect Holmes admired and who 
taught Holmes the value of dissent (pp. 315-22). 
One unifying theme throughout Holmes's early opinions was a 
deferential review of state legislation. Although it was his dissent in 
Lochner v. New York48 that would achieve more lasting fame, an 
earlier opinion, Otis v. Parker, 49 sounded the same themes of defer- . 
ence to majoritarian rule. The Lochner dissent continued the tradi-
tion, upholding labor legislation with the now-famous statement 
that the Constitution "is not intended to embody a particular eco-
nomic theory .... "so Yet Holmes was not, as White points out, a 
46. White does not explore the possible reasons for Holmes's prolific opinion-writing. 
Liva Baker posits two potential rationales: (1) "an unconscious desire to justify his survival 
in the war," and (2) "a similar desire to compensate for his childlessness." BAKER, supra 
note 5, at 383. 
47. Pp. 314-15; see also BAKER, supra note 5, at 441 ("In the rare references Holmes 
made to the other justices in his correspondence, he seemed bored with - even, on occasion, 
contemptuous of - their emanations, oral and written."). 
48. 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
49. 187 U.S. 606 (1902) (discussed at p. 323). In Otis, Holmes spoke for the Court in 
upholding a California statute that prohibited "[a]ll contracts for the sales of shares of the 
capital stock of any corporation •.. on margin," 187 U.S. at 607, on the ground that courts 
cannot invalidate every law judges believe to be "excessive, unsuited to its ostensible end, or 
based upon conceptions of morality with which they disagree." 187 U.S. at 608. 
50. 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes asserted that a constitution "is made 
for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions 
natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon 
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fervent liberal or progressive Justice; he upheld legislation not be-
cause of its progressive character, but instead because it repre-
sented the majoritarian view. Perhaps no field marked Holmes as 
less of a progressive than civil rights.51 
-· In Giles v. Harris, 52 Holmes wrote for the Court in denying eq-
uitable relief for a "political" wrong:53 the Court refused to grant 
equitable relief allowing a black citizen of Alabama to register to 
vote before the legislature instituted a more restrictive registration 
system. Bailey v. Alabama54 presented Holmes with another case 
fraught with racial implications. In Bailey, the Justice, in dissent, 
supported a presumption that a breach of a contract of servitude 
indicated an intent to injure or defraud one's employer (pp. 336-
37). In methodological contrast, Holmes ignored presumptions in 
United States v. Reynolds. 55 In his concurrence in Reynolds, 
Holmes concentrated on the empirical consequences of the viola-
tions of surety contracts,56 noting that "impulsive people with little 
intelligence or foresight may be expected to lay hold of anything 
that affords a relief from present pain .... "57 Holmes's civil rights 
opinions thus may be read to reveal a stereotypical attitude that 
White locates in the Justice's heritage as an "upper-class Bostonian 
... [who] had few opportunities for associations with blacks" (p. 
342). 
Holmes's unsympathetic stance toward minorities extended be-
yond the sphere of race (pp. 335-48). In one case, the Justice de-
the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United 
States." 198 U.S. at76. Holmes alsc> dissented from liberty of contract decisions in Adair v. 
United States, 208 U.S. 161, 190 (1908) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (dissenting from Court's deci· 
sion to invalidate a statute prohibiting discharge of employees because of union membership) 
and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1913) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (dissenting from 
Court's decision to strike down a statute prohibiting employers from preventing their em· 
ployees from joining labor organizations). See pp. 326-29. 
51. The paragraphs that follow emphasize Holmes's treatment of minorities in the judi· 
cial context. 
52. 189 U.S. 475 (1903). 
53. P. 334. White astutely notes that such wrongs were of a constitutional - in addition 
to political - dimension. 
54. 219 U.S. 219 (1911). 
55. 235 U.S. 133 (1914). 
56. These were agreements in which a surety paid the fine of a convicted person, who, in 
tum, worked a certain amount of time for the surety. If the convicted person failed to com· 
plete the work, he would be convicted and fined again. Pp. 337-38. 
57. P. 338 (quoting from 235 U.S. at 150 (1914) (Holmes, J., concurring)). White, in com· 
paring Holmes's views as manifested in these civil rights cases to his earlier pro-abolition 
views, persuasively notes that support for abolition did not precisely correlate with promot· 
ing equal rights for racial minorities. Although the author observes that Holmes failed to 
dissent from his contemporaries' hostile views of minorities, one cited example is unpersua-
sive: Holmes's rejection of the captaincy of a black regiment during the Civil War (p. 342) 
does not provide independent evidence of his views about blacks. This rejection - as White 
earlier noted (p. 68) - merely reflected Holmes's loyalty to his regiment. 
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ferred to a state governor's determination of whether an 
"emergency" existed, and thus whether the governor could jettison 
certain constitutional safeguards.ss Holmes also found that authori-
ties could detain anyone entering the United States unless that per-
son exhausted his administrative remedies and affirmatively proved 
his American citizenship.59 Even more shocking, the Justice later 
ruled that such border detentions, as final administrative decisions, 
were unreviewable by courts.60. In these cases, Holm~s f~ed to dis-
tinguish between aliens, to whom the statutes in question were di-
rected, and American citizens, who would also be denied 
constitutional protections. A final example of his ultradeferential 
review is Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 61 in which Holmes upheld against 
an equal protection challenge a state statute that prevented unnatu-
ralized foreign-born residents from "kill[ing] any wild bird or 
animal except in defence of person or property."62 
Throughout the biography, White emphasizes Holmes's hunger 
for recognition, which was still unsated after thirteen years on the 
Court (p. 353). Holmes's anonymity would disappear, however, 
when a group of progressives - led by then-Harvard Law Profes-
sors Felix Frankfurter and Harold Laski - read Holmes's opinions 
to conform with their agenda and proselytized the Justice. The 
progressives - or "acolytes" - latched onto the Justice's Loch-
ner dissent, his status as a "civilized" (in other words, nonbigoted) 
Puritan, and his judicial "realism."63 While Holmes was satisfied 
with the long-awaited recognition, a concomitant anxiety crept in, 
as he worried that "his reputation might 'fall' or that criticism might 
follow praise ... " (p. 371). Such criticism would not come from 
Holmes's admirers, who "were more interested in finding consis-
tency than in finding paradox" (p. 390). For example, although 
Holmes's acolytes attacked expansive judicial decisionmaking in 
58. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909) (discussed at p. 335). ' 
59. United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904). This proof was exceedingly difficult 
because of the lack of universal registration cards and the requirement that a citizen produce 
two witnesses attesting to his birth in the United States. P. 344. 
60. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905) (discussed at pp. 345·46). 
61. 232 U.S. 138 (1914). In discussing this case, White persuasively notes the inconsis-
tency between Holmes's deference to "local experience" and his examination of other states' 
treatment of the issue. Pp. 347-48. 
62. 232 U.S. at 143. 
63. Pp. 364-65. In addition to calling attention to the work of Holmes, the acolytes were 
"very good to the old fellow and ke[pt] him young." SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE 
JUSTICE: THE LIFE. OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 311 (1989) (quoting letter from Holmes to 
Baroness Moncheur (Mar. 10, 1916) (Holmes Papers (on file at Harvard Law School))). In 
particular, the acolytes were "intellectually exciting, adventurous; their minds were unfet-
tered, their spirits soared. Fearing perhaps the mental and spiritu~ stagnation that so often 
· accompanies old age, [Holmes] prized their youthful qualities more and more as he grew 
older." BAKER, supra note 5, at 491. As White notes, they were "buffers against age, links to 
prosperity." P. 606. 
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the constitutional arena, they ignored such discretion in the sphere 
of the common law (p. 380). They failed to note the contradictions 
between Holmes's attacks on the concept of a federal common 
law64 and application of his own version of such law in, for example, 
deciding whether young trespassers should be treated as children or 
adults,6s and what steps a driver approaching a railroad crossing 
must take to avoid negligence. 66 
One set of beliefs that the acolytes did not question was 
Holmes's views on eugenics, a field more widely accepted at the 
time than it is now.67 Indeed, the progressives viewed eugenics as a 
social "experiment" to be'embraced (p. 408). Holmes, in particular, 
was most enthusiastic about this type of reform - calling it "near 
to the first principle of real reform."68 Holmes revealed this enthu-
siasm to the public with his now-notorious statement in Buck v. 
Bell69 that "three generations of imbeciles are enough."70 
Even if Holmes was not enthusiastic about social and economic 
legislation,71 he deferred to such laws as a Justice. White explains 
64. Holmes found a federal common law "illusory" since state common law rules gov-
erned nonconstitutional state law disputes. Thus, federal judges "lacked justification for ig-
noring the states' sovereign dictates and inventing their own rules .... " P. 389. 
65. United Zinc Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268 {1922). In Britt, discussed at page 381, two 
boys wandered onto private land and died after swimming in a toxic pool. Holmes ignored 
the relevant state law, which relied on juries for the determination of status as child or adult, 
and held that the boys were adult trespassers, thus precluding recovery by their parents. 
66. Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 {1927) (promulgating a uni-
versal rule that drivers approaching railroad crossings must get out of their cars, look, and 
listen for a train). White notes that this approach was "absurd," because of the inflexibility of 
the rule and because the conduct required by Holmes could be more dangerous than not 
stopping at all. P. 385. 
67. As White states, "The idea of eugenic reform, to be effectuated through birth control, 
family planning, and voluntary or compulsory sterilization, was not thought to be a repressive 
one in the early twentieth century. On the contrary, it was associated with a paternalistic 
attitude toward the 'lower classes' .... " P. 407. Another commentator confirmed this 
observation: 
The American public was at the time caught up in a eugenics craze. Since the earliest 
years of the twentieth century, lecturers, books by enthusiastic laymen as well as scien-
tists, articles in law journals, newspapers, and magazines had popularized the idea that 
selective breeding could vastly improve the composition of the human race. 
BAKER, supra note 5, at 600. 
68. BAKER, supra note 5, at 603 (quoting letter from Holmes to Harold J. Laski (May 12, 
1927) (H91mes Papers (on file at Harvard Law School))). 
69. 274 U.S. 200 {1927) (upholding statute providing for the compulsory sterilization of 
"mental defectives"). 
70. 274 U.S. at 207. 
71. White fails to explore the roots of Holmes's lack of enthusiasm for reform. One ori-
gin may have been ~olmes's father, who "never showed the ardor for reform .•• which other 
spokesmen of the Boston tradition felt it to be their obligation and privilege to indulge." 
HoWE, SHAPING YEARS, supra note 4, at 24. Another may have been a skepticism that de-
veloped at Harvard College and matured through his experience in the Civil War. See Rei-
mann, supra note 36, at 74. Finally, the spirit of the age may have influenced Holmes: "His 
scorn of the mob, and perhaps of the very idea of democracy, was a common posture among 
nineteenth century Anglo-American legal thinkers." William P. LaPiana, Victorian from 
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this deference in discussing Holmes's dissent in Tyson & Brother v. 
Banton, 72 in which the Court struck down a state statute that fixed a 
maximum price for theater tickets. Holmes possessed the "fatalis-
tic" view, according to White, that no individual could stop the 
"force of public opinion" (p. 401 ), and that laws passed by repre-
sentatives of the majority should thus be upheld. Although White 
connects Holmes's "tolerance" of legislative regulation to his "fatal-
ism," he fails to locate the. ori~s of the latter .. philosophy in 
Holmes's inner self.73 Holmes posited another rationale for defer-
ence to state legislatures in noting their role as "social laborato-
ries"74 - a term coined ·by Justice Louis Brandeis. Highlighting 
precedent that upheld Congress's regulatory authority, he dissented 
from the Court's ruling in Hammer v. Dagenhart15 that Congress 
could not regulate "pre-commerce" conditions of child labor under 
the Commerce Clause (pp. 393-94). Similarly, he dissented in Ad-
kins v. Children's Hospital, 76 disagreeing with the Adkins majority's 
invalidation of a minimum wage law for women. In dissent, he once 
again attacked the primacy of liberty of contract and questioned the 
assumption that women had achieved equality with men (pp. 396-
97). 
One area in which Holmes did not completely defer to legisla-
tures, and, indeed, the area in which his opinions have achieved the 
greatest renown, is free speech. While on the Court, Holmes be-
came increasingly libertarian in this sphere, although his free 
speech opinions often emphasized rhetoric over reasoning (pp. 412-
13). Holmes applied the general law of criminal attempts to his 
early First Amendment cases (p. 418). He focused on the actor's 
intention to bring about a harm and the tendency of the action to 
produce that harm (p. 418). The initial cases in this arena arose in 
the context of World War I and the Espionage Act of 1917,77 a stat-
ute that aimed to prevent the incitement of insubordination in the 
armed forces and the obstruction of recruitment or enlistment of 
soldiers (pp. 415, 573 n.14). 
Beacon Hill: Oliver Wendell Holmes's Early Legal Sc~olarship, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 809, 832 
(1990). 
72. 273 U.S. 418, 445 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
73. Holmes's fatalism may well have stemmed from his experiences in the Civil War, 
from which he came to realize the insignificance of the individual. See supra note 8. 
74. Pp. 397-99 (discussing Holmes's dissent in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), 
where the Court struck down a state statute that prohibited injunctions against peaceful pick-
eting in labor disputes). 
75. 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
76. 261 U.S. 525, 567 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
77. Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. .217 (1917). 
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Schenck v. United States78 was the first free speech case arising 
under the Espionage Act to engage Holmes (pp. 415-20). Writing 
for the majority in Schenck, the Justice held that Socialist Party offi-
cials could be prevented from distributing anticonscription leaflets 
to those drafted to serve in World War I. He reasoned that "the 
document[s] would not have been sent unless [they] had been in-
tended to have some effect [and that effect would have been] to 
influence [those drafted] to obstruct the carrying [out of the 
war]."79 Although Holmes utilized language later canonized -
"man . . . falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic"8D 
and "clear and present danger"81 - such rhetoric, at least as con-
tained in Schenck, merely illustrated the law of criminal attempts. 
According to Holmes, the legislature had the power to restrict 
speech likely to result in an evil that Congress could prevent. In 
two other Espionage Act cases, Holmes extended this prohibition 
to obstruction attempts that were less obvious than those presented 
in Schenck. In the first, Debs v. United States, 82 the Justice again 
spoke for the Court in punishing Eugene Debs, a former Socialist 
Party candidate for President, for his remarks against the war and 
in support of those who had obstructed the war effort. Although 
Debs's remarks, made in the context of a Socialist convention, 
could have ultimately led to obstruction, Debs did not actively sup-
port this goal, thus distinguishing his case from Schenck. In the sec-
ond Espionage Act case, Frohwerk v. United States, 83 Holmes again 
applied the law of attempts to a case in which the danger of ob-
struction was attenuated.84 
The acolytes were disappointed with Holmes's opinions in the 
Espionage Act cases. Laski drew the Justice's attention to a 1919 
article in The New Republic by Ernst Freund - a law professor at 
the University of Chicago - that seriously criticized the Debs case 
(pp. 423-24) and invited Holmes to meet Zechariah Chafee. 
Chafee, a young Harvard law professor, urged Holmes to 
strengthen his "clear and present danger" test and to distinguish his 
First Amendment analysis from the common law of attempts (p. 
428). In addition to listening to the acolytes' suggestions, Holm.es 
78. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
79. 249 U.S. at 52. 
80. 249 U.S. at 52. 
81. 249 U.S. at 52. 
82. 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
83. 249 U.S. 204 (1919). 
84. [Even though i]t [did] not appear that [the obstructors made] any special effort to 
reach men who were subject to the draft ••• it [was] imrossible to say that it might not 
have been found that the circulation of the [materials was in quarters where a little 
breath would be enough to kindle a flame and that the fact was known and relied upon 
by those who sent the paper out 
249 U.S. at 208-09. 
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personally witnessed the evils of the Red Scare - in the failed at-
tempts to.oust Frankfurter, Laski, and Dean Roscoe Pound from 
the Harvard· Law School for their support of labor or status as 
Jews.85 
Presumably as a result of these developments, Holmes applied a 
new free speech methodology in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. 
United States. 86 In Abrams, a group of immigrants published and 
distributed leaflets advocating a strike among factory workers man-
ufacturing weapons.87. Although this could have more easily led to 
obstruction of the war effort than the activities at issue in th~ Espio-
nage Act cases,88 Holmes applied a more substantial "clear and 
present danger" test than previously utilized to uphold the free 
speech rights of the defendants. The Justice required a stricter in-
tent for obstruction than was previously necessarys9 and stressed a 
new rationale for free speech: interaction in the public marketplace 
of ideas leads to "truth."9° Dissenting in Abrams, Holmes articu-
lated a First Amendment jurisprudence that accorded distinctive 
significance to the freedom of speech, allowing the legislature to 
restrict it only if the nation's existence were directly threatened (p. 
436). 
Although Abrams marked the turning point in Holmes's First 
Amendment opinions, his subsequent opinions, as White remarks, 
85. See BAKER, supra note 5, at 529-30. 
86. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
87. 250 U.S. at 621. 
88. As White persuasively notes, . . 
Schenck had delivered circulars to draftees, but· the circulars had oily spoken abstractly 
of the evils of conscription; Frohwerk had not delivered circulars to anyone, and the 
pamphlets he printed were not directed specifi~y at draftees; Debs had not said any-
thing specific about draft resistance to World War I. The defendants in Abrams had 
printed leaflets and thrown them out the window of a factory, knowing they might be 
'received by munitions workers, whose factory was in the vicinity. 
P. 431 {footnotes omitted). 
89. He required the aim to obstruct to be the "proximate motive" of the act 250 U.S. at 
627 (Holmes, J., dissenting), discussed at. p. 43;'.. 
90. 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market •... "). White posits two 
sources for such a test: Holmes's cultural determinism and Chafee's notion that a free trade 
in ideas leads to truth. P. 435. Yet he does not explore two other factors. First, Holmes's 
war experience may have provided the seeds for the marketplace metaphor. As in war, 
power often determined victory in the marketplace of ideas. Holmes once defined truth as 
"the majority vote of that nation that can lick all others." P. 435 (quoting letter from Holmes 
to Judge Learned Hand (June 24, 1918) (Holmes Papers (on file at Harvard Law School))). 
Generally, Holmes saw "free speech as itself a fighting faith - based on a verbal model of 
battle." Gibian, supra note 3, at 212. A second origin may have been the influence of 
Holmes's father, who warned that "fear of open discussion implies feebleness of inward con-
viction and [that) great sensitiveness to the expression of individual opinion is a mark of 
weakness." BAKER, supra note 5, at 538 (quoting 2 THE W9RKS OF OLIVER WENDELL 
HoLMES, SR. 109 {1892)). Holmes himself demonstrates adoption of this view in his "per-
sonal belief that the Espionage Act prosecutions should not have been brought" and in 
"prid[ing] himself on not being 'hysterical' with respect to unpopular speech." P. 429. 
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do not systematically develop its rationale (p. 437). Holmes dis-
sented from cases in which the Court invalidated legislation that 
prohibited the teaching of foreign languages in public schools.91 In 
these cases, Holmes applied a lenient means-ends determination -
less than the heightened scrutiny of Abrams - to uphold the 
restrictive statutes (p. 440). Holmes appeared to move beyond the 
clear and present danger test in his dissent in United States v. 
Schwimmer,92 in which he advanced yet another rationale for free 
speech: primacy for the "freedom for the thought we hate. "93 Fi-
nally, White points out that Holmes's rhetorical flourishes, such as 
the assertion in Gitlow v. New YorkP4 that "[ e ]very idea is an incite-
ment,"95 provide a "distinctive literary style" more than "a new 
Frrst Amendment jurisprudence" (p. 445). 
In the chapter's conclusion, White details Holmes's inconsistent 
justifications for free speech, from Schwimmer's countermajor-
itarian "freedom for the thought we hate" to Abrams's majoritarian 
marketplace of ideas. The author also notes Holmes's failure to 
apply consistently the "clear and present danger" test articulated in 
Abrams, suggesting that Holmes "did not intend it as a doctrinal 
guideline at all ... [but rather as] an attempt to create an appear-
ance of consistency" with the earlier Schenck version of the test (p. 
451). White captures one of Holmes's major goals as a judge: 
"Holmes often treated judging as a kind of game, an exercise in 
which he tried to find 'a form of words' to justify a result .... "96 
Yet White's analysis of Holmes's First Amendment jurisprudence 
leaves the reader with some lingering questions. Did Holmes issue 
unconditional e~cts to distance himself from the endless questions 
of his father?97 Did the Justice aim to recall the spirit of war in 
lofty and memorable language?9B Regardless of the reason for 
Holmes's style, White effectively conveys to the reader an impor-
91. Pp. 438-41 (discussing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Bartels v. Iowa, 
262 U.S. 404 (1923)). According to White, these foreign language cases "made Holmes focus 
on protecting speech as a component of liberty, rather than focusing on a democracy's reli-
ance upon speech in the search for truth." P. 440. 
92. 279 U.S. 644, 653 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (dissenting from Court's decision to 
deny naturalization to a Hungarian pacifist who admitted in her application that she was not 
"willing to take up arms in defense of this country"). 
93. 279 U.S. at 654-55, quoted at p. 447. 
94. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
95. 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (dissenting from Court's decision to uphold 
statute outlawing advocacy of the overthrow of government), quoted at p. 444. 
96. P. 452. For a discussion of Holmes's rhetoric, see supra note 36. 
97. See supra note 9. 
98. One potential influence White does not discuss is James Fitzjames Stephen, an Eng-
lish scholar and judge, who possessed a "marvelously direct, muscular, vivid, witty, vivacious, 
economical style of writing" and a "moral hardness" that his friend Holmes may have 
adopted. JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY AND THREE BRIEF 
EssAYS 9-10 (foreword by Richard A. Posner) (1991). 
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tant point: that Holmes, although doctrinally inconsistent, supplied 
philosophical justifications for free speech that remain influential 
today (p. 453). 
After exploring the nuances of Holmes's Supreme Court opin-
ions, White turns to the Justice's aging process in Chapter Thirteen. 
He notes that the process was "long, slow, and on the whole satis-
factory," and that, in fact, his last decade on the Court may have 
been his most satisfying (p. 455). Holmes did not have significant 
health problems (pp. 455-56), and his last years bore witness to a 
variety of honors and achievements, climaxing in a nationwide ra-
dio address on his ninetieth birthday (pp. 462-65). Yet age would 
eventually catch up with the Justice, and in January 1932, with some 
prodding from Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, Holmes retired 
from the Court (pp. 466-67). For the first time in his life, "there 
was suddenly no central purpose, nothing to conserve his energies 
for and to concentrate his powers on" (p. 475). Three years later, 
two days shy of his ninety-fourth birthday, Holmes died. 
White ends his biography with "A Concluding Assessment." 
The author expertly traces Holmes's significant characteristics -
in particular, his ambition, passion, and interaction between "self" 
and "other"99 - through his professional (pp. 476-79) and personal 
(pp. 482-84) lives. White also summarizes Holmes's scholarship 
and opinions, highlighting the Justice's rhetoric and his ambitious, 
unconventional methodological goals (pp. 480-81). Finally, the au-
thor justifies his own project by noting Holmes's status as "a figure 
of great significance" (p. 486). White suggests that the root of 
Holmes's mystique lies in his position as both "a figure of popular 
romance" and an extremely influential icon in American legal his-
tory (pp. 486-88). 
* * * 
G.E. White's work is the most thorough biography ever written 
about Holmes.100 It is remarkable in its depth and readability. In 
focusing upon the relationship between his subject's personal and 
professional lives, White has tackled his project on perhaps its 
deepest and most rewarding level. Throughout his tour of Holmes's 
life and work, the author constantly points out and cross-references 
99. White explores the self-other interaction most notably in contrasting Holmes's quest 
for power, in his "efforts to impose [his] will on [his] appointed tasks," with his powerless-
ness, in his belief "that the contributions of any individual would be dwarfed in the universe." 
P. 479. 
100. Mark DeWolfe Howe, Holmes's official biographer, died after completing the first 
two volumes of his biography - taking the reader through The Common Law. See HoWE, 
SHAPING YEARS, supra note 4, and HoWE, PROVING YEARS, supra note 15. 1\vo recent sin-
gle-volume biographies, written by Liva Baker, see supra note 5, and Sheldon Novick, see 
supra note 63, lack the analysis of Holmes's legal scholarship and judicial opinions that White 
provides. 
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distinctive characteristics of his subject. In his final chapter, for ex-
ample, White traces Holmes's ambition from his early years to his 
quest for national recognition, and explores his subject's "zest ... 
for life" (p. 478). One superb example of White's success in this 
sphere is his analysis of Holmes's literary style. 
In exploring the gold mines of Holmes's rhetoric, White me-
thodically pursues his project, and is not mesmerized by the glit-
tering aphorisms penned by his subject. The author frequently 
notes potential origins of Holmes's rhetoric: a reaction to his father 
- who wrote in the genre of popular prose - and a literary heri-
tage and inclination. White conducts his analysis of Holmes's opin-
ions and writings on several levels, never sacrificing examinations of 
style or reasoning. Throughout the biography, the author parses 
Holmes's opinions and writings in extraordinary detail, examining 
his language meticulously and noting analytical gaps that the Jus-
tice's rhetoric often obscures. White effectively paints the picture 
of a Justice more interested in "stylj.stic elegance and pithiness" 
than "technical legal analysis and exegesis" (p. 410). 
The author~s exposition of Holmes's style is impeccable, in part 
because he located its genesis in Holmes's inner self. White draws 
on Holmes's inner self as a background to professional decisions, 
such as immersing himself in scholarship, joining the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, positioning himself for a seat on the U.S. 
Supreme Court, and seeking recognition through his association 
with the acolytes. 
Unfortunately, White does not integrate Holmes's personal life 
with the broad themes - such as judicial deference and a prefer-
ence for objective standards - he espoused in his professional ca-
pacity. Holmes's Civil War experience serves as an example of this 
omission. White magnificently traces Holmes's post hoc reaction to 
the Civil War, revealing his subject's honorable and majestic recol-
lection of the war, but he does not continue the analysis on the 
deeper level of the broad themes running through Holmes's judicial 
opinions and writings. For example, White does not treat the Civil 
War as a formative intellectual experience, sowing the seeds, per-
haps, of Holmes's preference for experience over logic or hi~ pref-
erence for objective rather than subjective standards. Nor does 
White emphasize the wartime roots of Holmes's belief in the insig-
nificance of the individual. This belief, which is central to Holmes's 
persona, may have had a substantial impact on theories he brought 
to the bench, such as a deferential review of legislation. Although 
White adequately describes Holmes's reaction to the Civil War, this 
examination fails to extend through Holmes's judicial work. 
To state that White could have explored further interactions be-
tween Holmes's personal and professional lives is not to diminish 
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what the author has accomplished. Indeed, in endeavoring to map 
a :figure's profound personal characteristics to his lifetime of 
achievement, one cannot possibly examine every conceivable inter-
action. White's achievement is that he started down this worth-
while path. With a thoroughness essential to his task and with an 
organization and creativity that ensure this work a place in the pan-
theon of great biographies, G.E. White has written a book that 
promises to be accessible and rewaromg to all. 
- Michael A. Carrier 
